Judicial Impeachment in India: Tough Law With a Loophole

Syllabus: GS2/Indian Polity; Judiciary

Context

• The motion submitted to Lok Sabha Speaker for removal of Justice GR Swaminathan of Madras High Court by INDIA bloc MPs has renewed public debate over the procedure and safeguards involved in the removal of judges under the Indian Constitution.

Constitutional Basis for Removal of Judges

• Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution: The removal of judges in India is governed by:
  • Article 124(4) & (5) for Supreme Court judges;
  • Articles 217(1)(b) & 218 for High Court judges;
• The Constitution uses the term ‘removal’ in the case of judges although commonly referred to as ‘impeachment’.
  • The term ‘impeachment’ applies only to the President of India (Article 61).
• Grounds for Removal: A judge can be removed only on grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.
  • However, the term misbehaviour is not defined in the Constitution of India, but judicial interpretation has clarified its meaning.

Judicial Interpretation of Misbehaviour

• The Supreme Court of India, in K. Veeraswami vs Union of India (1991), emphasized that honesty and impartiality are absolute standards for judges.
  • In M. Krishna Swami vs Union of India (1992), the Supreme Court held that not every error of judgment or negligence amounts to misbehaviour, it must involve wilful misconduct, corruption, or moral turpitude.

Legislative Framework: Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968

• Parliament enacted the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and the corresponding Rules, outlining the procedure for investigating charges against judges under Article 124(5)
• Key Provisions:
  • A motion for removal must be signed by at least 100 Lok Sabha MPs or 50 Rajya Sabha MPs.
  • The motion is submitted to the Speaker (Lok Sabha) or Chairman (Rajya Sabha).
  • The Speaker/Chairman decides whether to admit or disallow the motion.
• A three-member inquiry committee is constituted, comprising a Supreme Court judge, a Chief Justice of a High Court, and distinguished jurist, if admitted.
• If the committee finds the judge guilty of misbehaviour or incapacity, both Houses of Parliament need to pass a motion by a two-thirds majority before it is sent to the President, who then issues an order for removal.

Structural Flaw in the Impeachment Process

• Role of Speaker or Chairman: The removal procedure lies in the discretion vested in the Speaker or Chairmanto admit or disallow the motion.
  • The system’s weakness lies in allowing a single presiding officer to effectively terminate the process before investigation begins. 
  • Even when 100 or more MPs sign a motion, it can be dismissed at the threshold, rendering Parliament’s role redundant.
  • It undermines the principle of judicial accountability and gives undue power to the executive branch, which can indirectly influence the Speaker or Chairman’s decision.
• Lack of Defined Criteria: The Judges (Inquiry) Act does not specify the conditions for admissibility of such a motion.
  • Consequently, the decision to disallow can be made without assigning reasons, potentially nullifying a constitutionally backed effort supported by over 100 MPs.
  • It raises concerns about arbitrariness and executive influence, especially when the Speaker or Chairman acts as a statutory authority rather than as the presiding officer of the House.
• Constitutional Ambiguity: Article 124(5) does not empower the Speaker/Chairman to reject a motion.
  • It merely authorizes Parliament to regulate the procedure for investigation and proof of misbehaviour. 
  • The proof needs to come through a judicial inquiry, not through the Speaker’s preliminary scrutiny.

Need For Reform

• Reconsidering the Speaker’s Role: Given the constitutional intent of checks and balances, it is imperative that the Speaker’s or Chairman’s role be limited to procedural verification rather than substantive judgment of allegations.
  • The actual evaluation should rest with the independent inquiry committee.
• Ensuring Transparency: Any decision to reject a motion should be accompanied by written reasons and made subject to judicial review to avoid arbitrariness.
• Legislative Reforms: A re-examination of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is necessary to:
  • Define clear admissibility criteria for motions.
  • Mandate automatic reference to an inquiry committee when a motion meets constitutional requirements.
  • Safeguard the process from political interference while preserving judicial independence.

Conclusion

• The impeachment motion has reopened vital discussions about the balance between judicial independence and accountability. 
• The Constitution of India has a removal process to prevent misuse. However, the discretionary gatekeeping power vested in the Speaker or Chairman threatens to reduce this process to a political formality.
• The law needs to ensure that serious motions by elected representatives are not dismissed without due consideration to uphold public faith in the judiciary.
  • Revisiting the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is not just a procedural necessity, it is a constitutional imperative for a transparent and accountable judiciary.

Source: TH