One Nation, One Election: Constitutional Concerns

Syllabus: GS2/Governance

Context

• Comparative international experience and constitutional principles raise concerns regarding federalism, democratic accountability, and institutional design for the proposed ‘One Nation, One Election’ (ONOE) in India.

About One Nation, One Election (ONOE)

• It refers to the proposal to conduct simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies in India.
• The idea aims to synchronise electoral cycles so that elections across the country occur at the same time or within a short period.
• It proposes that elections for Lok Sabha, and State Legislative Assemblies should be conducted simultaneously, once every five years.
• Two implementation models:
  • Complete Synchronisation: All Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections are held together every five years.
  • Two-Cycle Model: Elections are conducted in two phases within a five-year cycle, grouping states together.

Historical Background

• 1951–1967: Elections to Lok Sabha and State Assemblies were held together. This system broke down due to:
  • Premature dissolution of State Assemblies;
  • Political instability;
  • President’s Rule in several states;
  • As a result, electoral cycles gradually staggered across the country.

Constitutional Framework in India

• India adopted a parliamentary system based on legislative accountability.
• Dr. BR Ambedkar argued in the Constituent Assembly that democracy cannot maximise both stability and responsibility simultaneously.
• India chose responsibility, meaning the executive remains accountable to the legislature at all times.
• Key Constitutional Provisions:
  • Articles 75 & 164: Collective responsibility of the executive to the legislature.
  • Articles 83 & 172: Maximum tenure of five years for legislatures (not guaranteed).
  • Early dissolution is therefore a democratic safeguard, allowing voters to renew the mandate when governments lose confidence.
• ONOE alters this logic by treating dissolution as an administrative inconvenience rather than a democratic mechanism.

Key Committees and Reports

• Law Commission of India (1999): It suggested exploring simultaneous elections to reduce political instability and expenditure.
• Parliamentary Standing Committee (2015): It recommended phased synchronisation of elections.
• NITI Aayog Discussion Paper (2017): It proposed a two-phase election model.
• High-Level Committee (2023): It was chaired by Former President Ram Nath Kovind, the committee recommended implementing ONOE through constitutional amendments.

Constitutional Amendment Proposal

• The proposal has taken legislative form in the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024, based on recommendations of the High-Level Committee chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind.
• Key Features:
  • Proposed Article 82A: Empowers the President to notify an ‘appointed date’ aligning all State Assembly tenures with the Lok Sabha.
  • Curtailment of State Assembly Tenure: Assemblies formed after the appointed date may have their terms shortened to synchronise with national elections.
  • ‘Unexpired-Term Elections’: If a legislature dissolves early, the newly elected legislature will serve only the remaining portion of the original term.
  • Election Deferral: The Election Commission of India (ECI) may recommend deferring State elections if simultaneous conduct is impracticable.
• Proposed Constitutional Changes: Implementing ONOE requires amendments to several constitutional provisions, ie:
  • Article 83: Duration of Lok Sabha;
  • Article 85: Dissolution of Lok Sabha;
  • Article 172: Duration of State Legislative Assemblies;
  • Article 174: Sessions of State Legislature;
  • Article 356: President’s Rule;
• Changes would also be required in Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Arguments in Favour of ONOE

• Reduction in Election Expenditure: Frequent elections involve significant costs for election administration, security forces, and campaign expenditure. Simultaneous elections could reduce public spending.
• Governance Efficiency: Frequent elections lead to repeated enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), which may delay policy decisions, and development projects.
  • ONOE could ensure continuity in governance.
• Reduced Political Polarisation: Continuous election cycles keep political parties in permanent campaign mode.
  • Simultaneous elections may allow governments to focus more on policy-making and administration.
• Administrative Convenience: Holding elections together reduces the need for repeated mobilisation of election officials, security personnel, and Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs).

Arguments Against ONOE

• Threat to Federalism: India is a federal polity, and states have independent political dynamics. Simultaneous elections may:
  • Reduce the importance of regional issues;
  • Strengthen national parties at the expense of regional parties;
• Constitutional Challenges: The parliamentary system allows early dissolution of legislatures. If a government collapses, fresh elections must be held.
  • Synchronising elections may require curtailing or extending legislative terms, which raises constitutional concerns.
• Impact on Voter Behaviour: Research indicates that simultaneous elections may produce a ‘national wave effect’. Voters may vote for the same party at both National level, and State level.
  • It may reduce the distinct political choices available in federal elections.
• Logistical Difficulties: India conducts elections in phases due to security requirements, large voter population, and administrative constraints.
  • Simultaneous elections would require massive deployment of resources.

Federalism Concerns

• Basic Structure Doctrine: In S.R. Bommai vs Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court declared that federalism is part of the Constitution’s basic structure.
  • States therefore possess independent democratic legitimacy.
• Impact of Synchronisation: ONOE could curtail State mandates for administrative convenience, and distort federal autonomy.
  • For example, if a State elects its legislature in 2033, synchronisation could force the mandate to expire in 2034, reducing the elected government’s tenure to just one year.
• Problem of ‘Unexpired-Term Elections’: The most controversial element of the proposal is mid-term elections for residual mandates.
• Constitutional Issues: The Constitution does not recognise the concept of a residual mandate.
  • Although the proposed amendments claim the new House is not a continuation of the old one, the system effectively preserves earlier electoral cycles.
• Risks of Constitutional Abuse: The proposed Article 82A(5) allows the Election Commission to recommend deferral of State elections without clear safeguards.
  • Unlike Article 356, which contains parliamentary oversight and time limits, this provision lacks explicit institutional checks.

Possible Implementation Models

• Fixed-Term Legislatures: Introduce fixed five-year terms to prevent premature dissolution.
• Constructive Vote of No Confidence: A government can be removed only if a new government is simultaneously elected.
• Two-Election Cycle: Conduct elections in two groups of states every 2.5 years.

Conclusion

• The promise of administrative efficiency and cost savings offered by One Nation, One Election is likely overstated. In contrast, the proposal raises profound constitutional concerns like curtailment of State mandates, weakening of federalism, distortion of parliamentary accountability, and risk of prolonged unelected governance.
• Comparative experience, particularly Indonesia’s failed experiment with simultaneous elections, demonstrates that electoral synchronisation can impose heavy democratic and administrative costs.
• India’s constitutional design emphasises responsibility, federal autonomy, and continuous democratic accountability. Any reform that disrupts these foundational principles risks undermining the basic structure of the Constitution.

Source: TH