
Syllabus: GS3/Economy
Context
- The Union government has constituted a High-Level Committee on Banking for Viksit Bharat, chaired by former Central Vigilance Commissioner Suresh N. Patel, to review banking laws, regulations, prudential standards and capital requirements, and improve global competitiveness.
About Public Sector Banks (PSBs) and Banking Reform in India
- PSBs are banks in which the government holds a majority stake. They combine commercial banking with developmental objectives such as financial inclusion, rural credit and support for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs).
- Banking reforms since 1991 have promoted competition, prudential regulation and operational efficiency.
- However, separating government ownership from day-to-day bank management remains an unfinished agenda.
Earlier Committees and Their Recommendations
- Narasimham Committee I (1991): Recommended greater operational autonomy, reduced government interference and a competitive banking system.
- Narasimham Committee II (1998): Advocated professional boards, stronger prudential norms and ending dual control by the Finance Ministry and RBI. It proposed reducing government ownership in PSBs to 33%.
- PJ Nayak Committee (2014): Recommended transferring government shareholdings to an independent Bank Investment Company (BIC), bringing PSBs under the Companies Act, empowering boards over executive appointments and remuneration, and ensuring ownership-neutral RBI regulation.
PSBs: Improved Financial Health and Continued Social Relevance
- Improved Financial Performance: Large PSBs’ average price-to-book ratio increased from approximately 0.6 in the late 2010s to around 1 in recent years.
- Their Return on Equity (RoE) has recovered to approximately 15%.
- However, PSBs, including IDBI Bank, wrote off nearly ₹13.6 trillion in loans during FY2010–FY2025, although subsequent recoveries remain possible.
- The government infused approximately ₹3.75 trillion into PSBs during FY2013–FY2022.
- Continued Developmental Importance: PSBs’ share of scheduled commercial bank deposits declined from approximately 75% in 2011 to below 60%.
- Nevertheless, they account for over 80% of rural deposits and around 70% of semi-urban deposits.
- A 2022 study by RBI economists, written in their personal capacity, found that private banks were more profit-efficient, while PSBs performed better in financial inclusion and exhibited less procyclical lending.
- Thus, governance reforms must preserve PSBs’ developmental role while improving commercial efficiency.
Governance Challenges and Issues With PSBs
- Excessive Administrative Control: The Department of Financial Services (DFS) handles several functions, including senior appointments, remuneration, performance monitoring and follow-up on RBI inspections.
- Such responsibilities should primarily rest with professional bank boards and regulators.
- Limited Board Autonomy: PSB boards have restricted authority over senior appointments and compensation.
- In FY2025–26, chief executives of the three largest private banks earned approximately 15–30 times more than their counterparts at major PSBs, excluding certain equity-linked incentives.
- Short Leadership Tenures: Frequent leadership changes weaken institutional continuity and long-term strategic planning.
- Regulatory Asymmetry: RBI lacks certain statutory powers over PSBs available for private banks, including powers concerning management removal and board supersession.
- Conflicting Objectives: Government-directed developmental activities may impose hidden costs on PSBs, reducing profitability and obscuring the fiscal burden of public programmes.
Global Experience: Lessons for India
- Singapore: Temasek holds a significant minority stake in DBS, while professional management handles commercial decisions and the Monetary Authority of Singapore regulates the bank.
- United Kingdom: An arm’s-length ownership arrangement facilitated the management and gradual reduction of government holdings in RBS/NatWest.
- OECD Guidelines: Emphasise professional ownership, merit-based boards and separation of ownership from regulatory functions.
- Cautionary Examples: Political influence in German public banking and China’s state holding-company model demonstrates that government ownership structures alone cannot guarantee operational independence.
Way Forward: Need for Institutional Reforms
- Separate Ownership and Management: Establish a professionally managed, independent government ownership institution with genuine decision-making authority.
- Empower Bank Boards: Allow boards to determine strategy, appoint executives, offer competitive remuneration and ensure leadership continuity.
- Ensure Regulatory Neutrality: Provide RBI with equivalent supervisory and enforcement powers over public and private banks.
- Make Developmental Mandates Transparent: Finance additional social obligations through explicit budgetary subsidies, guarantees or viability-gap support accessible to eligible public and private banks.
- Strengthen Accountability: Evaluate PSBs on profitability, asset quality, risk management, governance and financial inclusion.
Conclusion
- India’s banking sector needs its own ‘1991 moment’, separating government ownership from operational control. Stronger PSB balance sheets offer an opportunity to implement reforms from a position of strength.
- The principle of ‘Minimum Government, Maximum Governance’ should guide the creation of autonomous, accountable and globally competitive banks without compromising financial inclusion.
| Daily Mains Practice Question [Q] Public Sector Banks (PSBs) in India continue to face structural governance challenges despite improved financial performance. Examine the need for greater operational autonomy and ownership-neutral regulation to enhance their competitiveness. |