Grey-Zone Warfare and the LAC

Syllabus: GS3/ Defence

In News

• The face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops at multiple locations along the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh highlighted the concerns of grey-zone warfare.

What is Grey-Zone Warfare (GZW)?

• It is a form of conflict that stays below the threshold of conventional war but aims to achieve strategic objectives through ambiguity, deniability and coercion.
• China’s version draws on the idea of “Unrestricted Warfare”. Its main tools are political action, economic pressure, cyber operations and non-state actors.
• The PLA also follows the “Three Warfares”: public opinion, psychological and legal warfare.

How does China use it on the LAC?

• Infrastructure: New highways such as G695 and G580, railway lines under construction, and upgraded airfields and heliports near the border.
• “Nibble and negotiate”: Small changes on the ground through patrols and construction, which add up over time without triggering a strong response.
• Border villages: About 628 Xiaokang villages, mostly opposite Arunachal Pradesh, which can serve as forward posts. They are backed by China’s 2022 land border law.
• Renaming places: Chinese names for places in Arunachal Pradesh, as a way of backing territorial claims through maps.
• Wider alliances: Economic and security ties across Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean, including with Pakistan, to create two-front pressure.

Why is it hard to Counter?

• High-level meetings have eased tensions at some friction points, but the basic LAC disagreement remains.
• After 2020, the old Patrolling Points in Ladakh no longer work as shared reference points.
• Diplomatic warmth does not guarantee a calm border. China treats the boundary issue separately from wider ties.

What can India do?

• A clear national China strategy that links military readiness, border management, infrastructure, diplomacy and the economy.
• Better surveillance, intelligence, rapid reinforcement and logistics.
• A simpler command structure. One view is that a dedicated border force under Army operational control would respond faster than the ITBP, which reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs.
• Credible deterrence on land and at sea, so that small Chinese gains become costly.

Source: IE