A START For Multilateralism: Nuclear Proliferation Needs A Global Treaty

Syllabus: GS2/International Relation; Global Grouping

Context

• Global concern over nuclear security has intensified with the expiry of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia. 
• It fears that the world is edging closer to a renewed and unrestrained nuclear arms race.

Rising Global Threat Perceptions

• A Shifting Security Landscape: Global threat perceptions have risen sharply in recent years as geopolitical competition intensifies and the post–Cold War security order erodes.
  • It has amplified mistrust, accelerated military modernisation, and weakened long-standing arms-control norms.
• Return of Power Politics: Irredentism, neo-imperial ambitions, and assertive nationalism are once again shaping state behaviour.
  • Military force is increasingly used as a tool of coercion, while diplomatic mechanisms struggle to keep pace.
  • The resurgence of great-power rivalry has made conflict, both direct and proxy, more likely across multiple regions.
• Nuclear Risks and Strategic Instability: The erosion of nuclear-arms control agreements has significantly heightened perceptions of existential threat.
  • Nuclear-armed states like the United States, Russia, China, Israel, and Pakistan are expanding and upgrading their arsenals, with key treaties expiring and no credible replacements in place.
  • It has reduced transparency, weakened confidence-building measures, and increased the risk of miscalculation.
• Regional Insecurity Hotspots:
  • West Asia, where shifting alliances and latent nuclear ambitions add volatility.
  • Eastern Europe, shaped by war, territorial disputes, and military escalation.
  • East Asia, where strategic competition and arms build-ups are redefining deterrence dynamics.

A Widening Nuclear Landscape

• According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), there are nine nuclear-armed states possessing a combined 12,241 warheads, with 9,614 in military stockpiles (January 2025).
• Beyond the US and Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel have all expanded or upgraded their arsenals.
• India has overtaken Pakistan with about 180 warheads.
• China, with roughly 600 warheads, has the fastest-growing arsenal and is constructing hundreds of missile silos, potentially reaching parity with the US and Russia in intercontinental capabilities by the end of the decade.
  • Any future arms-control framework that excludes China is therefore likely to be ineffective.

Needs of Multilateral Mechanism For Disarmament

• Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): It still legally obliges its 191 member states to pursue nuclear disarmament, while New START has lapsed.
  • The NPT review conference scheduled for April–May offers a critical moment for renewed commitment.
  • The growing interest in nuclear capabilities across West Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia underscores the need for a multilateral approach to arms control.
• Nuclear Weapons and the Myth of Absolute Deterrence: The possession of nuclear weapons does not eliminate conflict.Low-intensity clashes, such as those between India and Pakistan, continue despite nuclear deterrence.
  • Nuclear weapons add the constant risk of catastrophic escalation, especially under hyper-nationalistic leadership where crisis decision-making can be unpredictable.
• Role of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), 2017: It is the only international agreement that comprehensively bans nuclear weapons.
  • It provides a moral and legal framework that could support broader disarmament efforts.
  • Although nearly 100 countries have signed it, with 70 ratifications, none of the nuclear-armed states have joined.

Other Suggested Measures

• Expand Arms Control Beyond a Bipolar Framework: Move past US–Russia centrism by formally including China and gradually integrating other nuclear-armed states.
  • Adopt a tiered or phased approach, where major nuclear powers take the lead, followed by regional nuclear states.
  • Recognise asymmetric arsenals and allow differentiated obligations rather than one-size-fits-all caps.
• Adopt a ‘Risk-Reduction First’ Strategy: Given current distrust, immediate disarmament is unrealistic. Prioritise crisis stability measures such as de-alerting nuclear forces, no-first-use (NFU) commitments, clear nuclear doctrines and red-line communication.
  • Establish nuclear risk-reduction centres among rival blocs (e.g., NATO–Russia, US–China, India–Pakistan).
• Strengthen Verification Through Technology: Use AI-assisted monitoring, satellite imagery, and remote sensing to enhance transparency.
  • Create a multilateral verification body under UN or IAEA oversight, reducing dependence on bilateral trust.
  • Allow managed access inspections to balance sovereignty concerns with credibility.
• Link Nuclear Arms Control to Regional Security Frameworks: Address regional threat perceptions, which often drive nuclear expansion.
  • East Asia: link arms control to Taiwan and Korean Peninsula stability.
  • South Asia: integrate confidence-building with conventional-force restraint.
  • West Asia: revive discussions on a WMD-free zone.
• Address Emerging Technologies Explicitly: Include hypersonic weapons, cyber interference, AI-enabled command systems, and space assets in future agreements.
  • Prevent entanglement of nuclear and conventional systems that could cause accidental escalation.
  • Establish norms against cyberattacks on nuclear command-and-control systems.
• Depoliticise Arms Control Institutions: Insulate arms control talks from day-to-day geopolitical crises.
  • Use Track II and Track 1.5 diplomacy involving scientists, former officials, and strategic experts.
  • Restore arms control as a technical security exercise, not a bargaining chip.
• Rebuild Strategic Trust Incrementally: Start with modest, verifiable steps rather than grand treaties.
  • Extend or replicate transparency and data-exchange mechanisms from past agreements like New START.
  • Regular high-level dialogue among nuclear powers must be institutionalised, not crisis-driven.

Conclusion: A Moment for a Fresh Start

• The expiry of New START is a reminder of the fragility of global nuclear restraint.
• The international community has an opportunity to push for inclusive, multilateral disarmament talks rather than sliding into a new arms race.
• A genuine ‘fresh start’ will require leadership from the principal nuclear powers and sustained global pressure to ensure that nuclear weapons do not continue to define the future of international security.

Source: BS