Syllabus: GS3/Internal Security
In News
- Authorities started using the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) to trace and track suspects and criminals, though several practical challenges remain on the ground.
Background
- The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks (“26/11”) exposed intelligence lapses, particularly the failure to connect disparate data about the attackers, including David Coleman Headley.
- In response, institutional and technological reforms were initiated, with NATGRID (National Intelligence Grid) emerging as the “crown jewel” of India’s post-26/11 intelligence apparatus.
NATGRID
- NATGRID is a database compiled by the Ministry of Home Affairs that contains over 24 sets of data, such as immigration records, banking details, travel history, and phone data, among others, to help agencies identify and monitor suspects.
- It was conceived in 2008 after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.
- It was first announced in 2009 but operationalized in 2012 via executive order
Recent Developments
- NATGRID reportedly receives ~45,000 queries per month and access is now extended to police officers down to the rank of Superintendent of Police.
- Integration with the National Population Register (NPR, covering 1.19 billion residents) has raised concerns about mapping entire populations, moving beyond targeted intelligence to mass surveillance.
- Technological Capabilities: Analytical engine “Gandiva” enables entity resolution, linking fragmented records to individuals.
- Facial recognition and KYC databases can now be cross-referenced, allowing inferences at scale about individuals’ intentions.
Concerns
- Algorithms may reproduce or amplify societal biases (caste, religion, geography), falsely labeling individuals as threats.
- Tens of thousands of queries processed monthly may render logging ineffective; independent scrutiny is minimal.
- NATGRID risks shifting from counter-terrorism to everyday policing without statutory safeguards.
- Courts have not fully adjudicated the legality of intelligence programs lacking clear statutory backing; Puttaswamy (2017) privacy protections remain underutilized.
- Intelligence failures stem from weak institutions and poor accountability; without independent oversight, NATGRID risks enabling digital authoritarianism rather than preventing threats.
Conclusion
- NATGRID, while designed to prevent terror, has evolved into a mass surveillance architecture. Its expansion without statutory, judicial, or parliamentary oversight risks normalizing suspicion and encroaching on civil liberties.
- True prevention requires accountability, transparency, and legally grounded intelligence practices.
Source :TH
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