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Internal Security

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
CHAPTER 4

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM

4.1 Introduction

The Government of India defines Naxalism and Maoism as Left Wing Extremism (LWE) and is dealt with by a separate division of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Left-wing extremists endeavour to overcome the existing state and social order by replacing democracy with a communist or anarchist system. To this end, they participate in social protests, trying to instrumentalise them for their purposes.

The CPI (Maoist) Party is the major Left Wing Extremist outfit responsible for majority of incidents of violence and killing of civilians and security forces and has been included in the list of Terrorist Organisations along with all its formations and front organisations under the *Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967*. The CPI (Maoist) philosophy of armed insurgency to overthrow the Government is unacceptable under the Indian Constitution and the founding principles of the Indian State. The Government has given a call to the Left Wing Extremists to abjure violence and come for talks. This plea has been rejected by them, since they believe in violence as the means to capture State power. This has resulted in a spiralling cycle of violence in some parts of India.



Current Scenario

As per Annual Report of MHA (2021-2022), The declining trend which started in 2011 continues in 2021 as well. There has been an overall 55% reduction in violent incidents (1136 to 509) and 63% reduction (397 to 147) in LWE related deaths in 2021 as compared to 2013. In comparison to 2020, the year 2021 saw a decline of 24% (665 to 509) in incidents of violence and the resultant deaths by 20% (183 to 147). At the same time, the developmental outreach by the government of India has seen an increasingly large number of LWE cadres shunning the path of violence and returning to the mainstream. Owing to the improved LWE scenario, the list of LWE affected districts has been revised twice in the last 03 years. The number of LWE affected districts was reduced to 90 in April 2018 and then to 70 in July-2021. At the same time, the developmental outreach by the Government of India has seen a large number of LWE cadres shunning the path of violence and returning to the mainstream. The overall improvement in the LWE scenario can be attributed to greater presence and increased capacity of the Security Forces across the LWE affected States, better operational strategy and better monitoring of development schemes in affected areas

4.1.1 Maoism

Maoism is a form of communism developed by Mao Tse Tung. It is a doctrine to capture the State power through a combination of armed insurgency, mass mobilization and strategic alliances. The Maoists also use propaganda and disinformation against State institutions as other components of their insurgency doctrine. Mao called this process, the '*Protracted People's War*', where the emphasis is on 'military line' to capture power.

4.1.2 Maoism in India

The largest and the most violent Maoist formation in India is the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The CPI (Maoist) is an amalgamation of many splinter groups, which culminated in the merger of two largest Maoist groups in 2004; the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), People's War and the Maoist Communist Centre of India. The CPI (Maoist) and all its front

organizations formations have been included in the list of banned terrorist organizations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

4.1.3 Maoism vs Naxalism

Naxalism originated as a rebellion against lack of development and poverty at the local level in the rural parts of eastern India. The term 'Naxal' derives its name from a village called Naxalbari in the State of West Bengal where the movement had its origin. The Naxals are considered far left radical communists who support Maoist political ideology. Their origin can be traced to the split that took place in the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1967. It led to the formation of Communist Party of India (Marxist and Leninist). Initially the movement had its centre in West Bengal. Thereafter, it got spread into less developed areas of rural central and eastern India, such as, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh through the activities of underground groups like the Communist Party of India (Maoist).

On the other hand, the term **Maoist** refers exclusively to cadres and leaders of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). All Maoists are Naxalites, but all Naxalites are not Maoists.

4.2 Evolution of Left-Wing Extremism

It was in 1967, when a small group of Communist Party of India (Marxist) leaders decided to break away and launch their own armed struggle against big landowners. These leaders were Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal. Their objective was to snatch the lands from the big zamindars and re-distribute the same among the tilling farmers and landless labourers.

The then President of the Siliguri Kisan Sabha Jangal Santhal started organising people for the same. But, within a week of the call for armed struggle, a sharecropper was attacked and killed at a village near Naxalbari by the armed band of the local zamindar. This incident took place on May 24, 1967. The next day, Jangal Santhal led a group of tribals to ambush a police team which had come to investigate the killing of the farmer. A sub-inspector was killed as the Naxalbari team attacked the police convoy with bows and arrows. The incident took place at Naxalbari, which gave the armed movement its name.

EVOLUTION OF NAXALISM IN INDIA: PHASES DESCRIPTION

British and Post Independence Era

- 1925: Formation of Communist Party of India at Kanpur.

- Post Indo China War (1962) differences emerged in the Party.
- 1964: Birth of CPI (ML).

First Stage (1967- 75)

- In 1967 a peasant uprising took place in the Naxalbari.
- In 1969, CPI (M) was broken and a new party, Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) (CPIML), was formed under the leadership of Charu Majumdar.
- Formation of All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR).

Second Stage (1975-2004)

- Continued their struggle under the "Strategy of Protracted War".
- CPI (ML) converted into the People's war group in 1980
- At the same time Moist Communist Centre of India strengthen in Bihar (MCCI).

Third Stage (2004 onwards)

- People's War Group combined with Moist Communist Centre of India and Formed CPI (Moist).
- This whole contiguous zone where CPI (Moist) was active, which is spread in West Bengal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Maharashtra and Telangana is known as 'Red Corridor'.

4.3 Objectives of Naxalism

Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said that "**Naxalism is considered to be one of the biggest internal security threats India faces.**" The Naxalites consider the state power as a weapon in the hands of the rich and the ruling classes which are against their movement.

The prime objectives of Naxalism are:

- **Destroying the State Power:** To destroy the state power in all its forms and create a new one of their choice and act merrily in the domain they have established for themselves. The main cause of the rise of the Naxal movement was a revolt against the government and the land ceiling acts that were implemented and practiced at that time. The peasants were ignored predominantly by the government which lead to an uprising with armed rebellion during that time.
- **Taking over the Government:** To take over the government and establish their own government in the state because after years of neglect they lost every faith that they used to have on the political system of the country.
- **Creating Mass Base:** To destroy the State legitimacy, and to create a mass base, with certain degree of acceptability, with the ultimate object of attaining political power by violent means. The

naxalites predominantly attack the police and the police establishments.

- **Targeting Legislatures:** To target the people's representative of the state assembly and the parliament, they kill democratically elected leaders and also the common people to create fear and panic among the public so that they remain docile to their rule.
- **Destroying Public Infrastructure:** To destroy certain types of infrastructure, like rail and road transport and power transmission lines and also forcibly oppose execution of development works, like critical road construction etc.
- **Radicalising Industrial Workers:** In the recent years, there has been a clear indication that the Naxalites are trying to penetrate into the urban cities. Their main motive is to gain a substantive control over the deprived working class of people and use their deprivation and anger as a tool to spread Naxal ideology. Their immediate short term objective is to gain a substantive control over the trade unions in the cities and make them aligned to Naxal ideology. Prominent naxal leaders have been arrested from urban centers like Asansol, Jamshedpur, Surat, Kolkata and Raipur.
- **Radicalising Youth:** Many youths are attracted due to romantic illusion of Maoist, arising out of incomplete understanding of their ideology. The Front Organization deals with recruitment of 'professional revolutionaries', raising funds for the insurgency, creating urban shelters for underground cadres, providing legal assistance to arrested cadres and mass mobilisation by agitating over issues of relevance/ convenience. The Front Organisations aim to provide short-term democratic deception to cover-up the totalitarian and oppressive nature of the Maoist ideology.

4.4 Factors Responsible for Rise of Naxalism

Land Related Factors:

- Tribal peoples' dissatisfaction with the government: The Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 forbids tribals who depend on forest goods for their livelihood from even harvesting a bark.

Jal-Jangal-Jameen (3Js)

- Encroachment and occupation of govt. and community lands
- Non-regularization of traditional land rights
- Evading ceiling laws
- Acquisition of land without appropriate compensation and rehabilitation

Political Factors:

- Nature and apathy of the political system towards Tribals remained one of the most important factors that led to such uprisings.
- Inability of political authority towards the deprived sections of society in India to provide avenues for structural uplift in the affected states.
- Lack of political participation by the tribal community.

Economic Factors:

- **Issues:** A few problems include communication, access to energy, poverty, a lack of access to health care, a lack of awareness and education, and unemployment.
- **Income Gap:** The gap in wealth between the wealthy and the poor is growing.
- **Issues of agrarian community:** The Maoists have included in their programme signing off the peasant's debts, besides restoration of farm subsidies, investment in irrigation, proper prices of farm produce and restricting Multinational Companies.

Environmental Degradation:

- Environmental degradation in the form of the destruction of land and water resources due to mining and industrial activities.

Lack of basic facilities:

- Lack of basic facilities like education, freedom, sanitation and food.
- The socially backward tribals form the major support base for Naxalites because of inequality, illiteracy and lack of opportunities

Governance Deficit:

- Improper Implementation of Govt Initiative: Regular administration, lack of state government action to solve the issue, absence of administration in remote areas, execution, and improper management of government initiatives.

Social deficit:

- Violation of human rights
- Abuse of dignity of life
- Disconnect with mainstream society
- Note: There is debate about whether Naxalism should be viewed as a social issue or a threat to national security.

Development Deficit:

- Lack of Infrastructure
- Huge gender and income gap
- Lack of health and education facilities

4.5 Urban Naxalism

The term “Urban Naxals” is generally used to refer to individuals with a Naxalite mentality who live in urban areas and serve as activists, advocates, and defenders of the ideology while the active Naxals engage in combat in the forests and large swaths of Maoist-controlled territory.

This was highlighted even in their 2004. *Communist Party of India (Maoist) document titled “Urban Perspective”* elaborates on this strategy with one of the most important focus areas being on gaining leadership from urban areas. In relation, the security establishment believes that with ageing leadership, the Maoists have been looking at cities and towns for leaders. It feels that this is keeping in line with the tradition that most of their top leaders are well educated people from universities.

The intelligence reports believe that there are many active front organizations in various Indian cities which are supporting Urban Naxalism including Mumbai, Delhi Kolkata, Chandigarh, Ranchi, Hyderabad, Madurai, Thiruvananthapuram, Nagpur and Pune.

For instance, In 2018, Pune Police arrested five persons across different cities in connection with a probe on the Bhima-Koregaon riots.

Challenges of Urban Naxalism

- **Mobilising Industrial Workers:** The main focus of Maoists’ urban work is penetrating the working class movement in important industries such as communication, oil and natural gas, coal, transport, power, defence production, etc. In 2006, the detection of Maoist activities in cities such as Surat (Gujarat) and subsequently at a later stage on several other industrial belts, is a clear testimony to this.
- **Capturing Students into their Fold:** The Urban Movement has been successful in attracting the students towards the Maoist fold in various parts of the country. Security agencies believe that the front organizations have initiated vigorous movement in the education arena, to attract students from several reputed colleges for fulfilling their objectives.
- **Logistics Support:** The Maoists establish a network in cities and manufacture rocket arts and transport in other parts of the country. This has been witnessed when the police seized empty rocket shells and rocket launchers in 2006, in Mahabubnagar district, Andhra Pradesh.
- **Exploitation of Urban Faultlines:** The Urbanisation in India itself has some faultlines and the Maoists

could well exploit these faultlines to their advantage. The Maoists also enjoy sympathy and support among the urban intellectuals and the middle class, that includes students and teachers in schools, colleges and universities.

- **Shadowing behind Civil Society:** There have been many occasions where important top-level leaders of the CPI (Maoist) have been arrested from cities and towns hiding under the garb of civil society.
- **Formation of United Front:** The main focus of the Maoists’ urban work is to organise the masses, including the working class, students, middle-class employees, intellectuals, women, Dalits and religious minorities. Naxals create front organisations for extending the reach of the organisation.
- **Legal Aid to Military Task:** The military wings of CPI-M, PGI and PLGA, were to carry out the military tasks in the rural and least developed regions of the country while the urban Naxals were to complement their efforts by recruiting cadres and sending them into the countryside.

Way Forward

- **Tackling Urban Naxalism:** The strategy to tackle Left-Wing Extremist (LWE) challenges must include the plans to tackle ‘Urban Naxalism’ as well.
- **Provision in Budget:** The budgets should have separate provisions to counter the expanding Naxal footprint in cities.
- **Legal Proceedings:** State must initiate legal action against the Maoist front organizations.
- **Policy For Deradicalisation:** Centre to create an overarching legal framework aimed at aiding, directing, and coordinating actions of individual states to combat radicalization.

4.6 Challenges in Dealing With Naxalism

The Government’s approach is to deal with Naxalism in a holistic manner, in the areas of security, development, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities, improvement in governance and public perception management.

Naxalism is no longer perceived as a law and order problem rather it is perceived as a socio-economic problem. However we still witness incidents like Sukma Bijapur (Chhattisgarh) attack in April 2021, where at least 22 jawans were killed and 31 sustained injuries in the

deadly encounter between security forces and Naxals as well as Dantewada ambush, where 75 paramilitary personnel and one state police constable were killed in 2010.

1. Economic Efficiency

The failure of “economic growth trickle down model” has left the remote tribal society downtrodden. The dense forest regions of Chhattisgarh – Telangana are rich in minerals and hence, exploited by the capitalist class. This exploitation percolates even to procurement of tribal goods. It was perceived that economic growth in these regions would ensure development of the tribal people.

Inclusive growth is the only solution to the economic concern of tribal people. This would facilitate a feeling of belonging towards the government and would create a gulf between the tribes and Naxals.

2. Social Justice

The whole debate of social justice is an oscillation between class conflict and class cooperation. Mahatma Gandhi, a firm believer in class cooperation talked about “Trusteeship modal for the society”. This principle if followed will ensure due course of justice without class struggle. However if neglected would lead to strengthening of the armed rebellion and there support base. Land ownership, lack of Minimum support prices for tribal produce creates a sense of alienation towards the government.

3. Security

The problem is compounded by the fact that the LWE/ Maoists corridor spreads across several States and the perceived lack of a common plan has left each State government combating the Naxals as per their own strategy.

4.7 Government's Approach to Counter Naxalism

Government is committed to deal strongly with naxalites indulging in crime and violence. The overall objective being to uphold the law of the land, provide security of life and property and provide a secure environment for development and economic growth.

1. Police Modernisation

Under scheme of “Modernisation of Police Forces (MPF)” for 3 years’ from 2017-18 to 2019-20, the total outlay of Rs 26,061 crore is to be shared between Center and States in 75:25 ratio. Scheme of Special Central

Assistance (SCA) for 35 worst LWE affected districts has been introduced with an outlay of Rs. 3,000 crore to tackle the issue of underdevelopment in these district. It is expected that the umbrella scheme, “Modernisation of Police Forces (MPF)” will go a long way to boost the capability and efficiency of Central and State Police Forces by modernizing them.

It is a sub scheme under MPF scheme. Security Related Expenditure Funds are provided for meeting the recurring expenditure relating to insurance, training and operational needs of the security forces, rehabilitation of Left Wing Extremist (LWE) cadres who surrender in accordance with the surrender and rehabilitation policy of the State Government concerned, community policing, security etc.

2. Development

Development is the only approach that can eliminate any discontent in the long term. Areas affected by naxalism are mostly some of the backward regions of India. These include Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh etc.

It is due to lack of basic infrastructure and poor governance which made life miserable for tribals and other poor residing in these regions that this movement grew in monster proportion.

The development includes:

Development Related Measures

- Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY).
- National Rural Health Mission (NRHM).
- Ashram School.
- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA).
- Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA).
- National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP).
- Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PMKVY).
- Deen Dayal Upadhyay Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY).
- Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS).
- Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Right) Act, 2006.
- Health and Wellness Centre.
- Aspirational District Programme.

Strengthening panchayats, forest committees and bringing land reforms – are some of the measure that needed urgent effective implementation to stop the spread of naxalism. Finally, Government has put some mechanism in place for carrying out these measures.

Aspirational District Programme in 35 LWE Affected Districts

Transformation of Aspirational Districts programme aims to quickly and effectively transform these districts. The broad contours of the programme are Convergence (of Central & State Schemes), Collaboration (of Central, State level 'Prabhari' Officers & District Collectors), and Competition among districts driven by a mass Movement. With States as the main drivers, this program will focus on the strength of each district, identify low-hanging fruits for immediate improvement, measure progress, and rank districts.

Integrated Action Plan

The Government approved an Integrated Action Plan (IAP) for Selected Tribal and Backward Districts in 2010. The funds are to be placed at the disposal of the District Collector and consisting of the Superintendent of Police of the District and the District Forest Officer.

Scheme of Special Infrastructure

Critical infrastructure gaps could not be covered under the existing schemes. These relate to requirements of mobility for the police/security forces by upgrading existing roads/tracks in inaccessible areas, providing secure camping grounds and helipads at strategic locations in remote and interior areas, measures to enhance security in respect of police stations/outposts located in vulnerable areas etc.

3. Anti-Naxal Operation

- In dealing with this decades-old problem, it has been felt appropriate, after various high-level deliberations and interactions with the State Governments concerned, that an integrated approach aimed at the relatively more affected areas would deliver results.
However, 'Police' and 'Public Order' being State subjects, action on maintenance of law and order lies primarily in the domain of the State Governments.
- The Central Government endeavours by providing Central Armed Police Forces and Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA), sanction of India Reserve (IR) battalions, setting up of Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorism (CIAT) schools.
- The modernisation and upgradation of the State Police and their Intelligence apparatus under the Scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces.

4. Creation of Left Wing Extremism Division

This Division was created in 2006 in the Ministry of Home Affairs to effectively address the Left Wing

Extremist insurgency in a holistic manner. The LWE Division implements security related schemes aimed at capacity building in the LWE affected States. The Division also monitors the LWE situation and counter-measures being taken by the affected States.

Role and Functions of the Division

- Deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) in LWE affected States.
- Reimbursing security related expenditure incurred by the LWE affected States under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme.
- Providing assistance to the State Governments for construction/strengthening of fortified police stations under the Scheme for Construction/ Strengthening of Fortified Police Stations in LWE affected districts.
- Providing funds to the CAPFs for Civic Action Programme in LWE affected areas.
- Reviewing the security situation in the LWE affected States and issuing advisories to the State Governments concerned.
- Providing assistance to State Governments towards capacity building to combat LWE.
- Coordinating implementation of LWE related Schemes of other Central Ministries for LWE affected Districts.

CRPF Raises Bastariya Battalion

CRPF raises Bastariya Battalion to combat Naxals activities in Bastar region of Chhattisgarh: Bastariya Warriors is a newly formed battalion of the CRPF that consists of recruits exclusively from the 4 districts of Bastar region. The battalion will be immensely helpful in operations, as its recruits are familiar with the local terrain and language. This battalion is expected to act as a bridge between the local populations in the Red Corridor and other CRPF personnel (mostly from elsewhere in India).

5. Surrender Policies

Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation policy is part of the overall policy to build consensus and evolve an acceptable and peaceful solution to violence perpetrated by extremist groups, to usher in peace and development, especially in the disturbed regions. The objectives of surrender-cum-rehabilitation of naxalites in the naxal affected States are:

- To wean away the misguided youth and hardcore naxalites who have strayed into the fold of naxal movement and now find themselves trapped into that net.

- To ensure that the naxalites who surrender do not find it attractive to join the naxal movement again.
- Tactical surrenders by those elements who try to make use of the benefits extended by the Government to further their vested interests should not be encouraged under the Scheme.

6. Samadhan Doctrine 2017

The Union Home Minister enunciated a strategy through which the LWE can be countered with full force and competence. The new strategy is called Samadhan, which is a compilation of short term and long term policies formulated at different levels.

SAMADHAN Doctrine	
S	Smart Leadership
A	Aggressive Strategy
M	Motivation and Training
A	Actionable Intelligence
D	Dashboard Based KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) and KRAs (Key Result Areas)
H	Harnessing Technology
A	Action plan for each Theatre
N	No access to Financing

7. Initiatives by Individual States

Today, Naxalite activity has affected over 90 districts of the country because of rising agrarian distress, destruction of forests by timber mafia, uprooting of adivasis due to predatory mining, irrigation and metallurgical projects, regional disparities etc.

Black Panther combat force: A specialised anti-Naxal combat force for Chhattisgarh on the lines of the Greyhounds unit in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.

Bastariya Battalion: A newly formed battalion of CRPF with more than 534 tribal youth from four highly Naxalinfested districts of Chhattisgarh and adequate female representation in sync with the government's policy of 33% reservation for women making it the first composite battalion in any of paramilitary forces.

The Centre is providing all help to the states in form of granting funds for Police Modernisation Schemes, armoured vehicles, latest equipments required for operations and for any other development schemes required by the state.

- Unified Command in the States of Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Jharkhand and Odisha, which constituted of officers from the security establishment, besides civilian officers representing the civil administration and it will carry out carefully planned anti-LWE measures.

- The Command & Control setup in the States of West Bengal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha has been re-structured and an IG from CRPF posted in each of these states to work in close coordination with IG (anti-naxal operations) in the State.

Rehabilitation Policy of Andhra Pradesh

The government of Andhra Pradesh has an effective surrender and rehabilitation policy of Naxalities and has produced good result over the years. The other states should adopt a similar policy. The state governments will need to accord a higher priority in their annual plan to ensure faster socio-economic development of the Naxal affected areas.

8. Schemes for Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) Affected States

In order to holistically address the LWE problem in an effective manner, Government has formulated National Policy and Action Plan adopting multi pronged strategy in the areas of security, development, ensuring rights & entitlement of local communities etc.

- **Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme:** Under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme assistance is provided to 90 LWE affected districts in 11 States for recurring expenditure relating to operational needs of security forces, training and insurance and also for compensation to Left Wing Extremist cadres who surrender in accordance with the surrender and rehabilitation policy of the concerned State Government, community policing, security related infrastructure by village defence committees and publicity material.
- **Installation of Mobile Towers:** The Government has approved for the Installation of Mobile Towers in Left-Wing Extremist area. Under this scheme, in Phase-I, 2329 Mobile Towers in 10 LWE affected States have been operationalized. Phase-II of Mobile Tower Project in LWE affected areas is under consideration.
- **Scheme for Fortification of Police Station:** The Ministry has sanctioned 400 police stations in 10 LWE affected States at a unit cost Rs. 2 crores under this scheme. A total of 397 of PSs have been completed as on 2019 and work at 3 PSs is under progress.
- **Special Infrastructure Scheme:** The earlier Special Infrastructure Scheme which was under implementation from 2008-09 to 2014-15, has now been revived for a period of 3 years from 2017-18 to 2019-20 for strengthening of the intelligence

mechanism and Special Forces of the States and for fortification of Police Stations.

- **Road Connectivity Project Plan for Left Wing Extremism Areas:** The Road Requirement Plan (RRP) Phase-I was approved in 2009 for improvement of road connectivity in LWE affected districts in 8 States viz. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. The RRP-I envisages development of National Highways and State Roads.

The Government approved this RRP-II in 2016 to further improve road connectivity in 44 districts of 9 LWE affected States. This Scheme envisages 5412km roads and 126 bridges at an estimated cost of Rs. 11,725 Crores. Ministry of Rural Development is the nodal Ministry for this project. The roads included under the scheme have been identified by the Ministry of Home Affairs in consultation with the State Governments and the security agencies.

- **Civic Action Programme:** This scheme is meant for financial grants allocated to Central Armed Police Force to perform civic action in the Naxal affected states. The main motive behind the scheme is to win the hearts and minds of local communities and provide them with positive attitude through small development schemes, which will mitigate the problems of people living in insurgency hit areas and also bring confidence to security forces.
- **Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996:** The Left Wing Extremism affected States have been asked to effectively implement the provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) on priority, which categorically assigns rights over minor forest produce to the Gram Sabhas.
- **Unified Command:** The Government established a Unified Command for inter-state coordination in 2010, (in intelligence gathering, information sharing and police responses) between Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal.

9. ROSHNI Scheme

ROSHNI Scheme is a special initiative under Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana

that provides placement-linked skill development for rural youth in 24 LWE-affected districts in India.

- **Skill India Mission:** Skill Development in 34 Districts affected by Left Wing Extremism under implementation from 2011-12 aims to establish ITIs and Skill Development Centers in LWE-affected districts Other Measures:

10. Perception Management

The Government has decided to change its strategy and adopt a “more localised approach” to deal with Left Wing Extremism (LWE).

“*New counter LWE strategy*” of the government is based on elements of security-related measures, development-based approach, rights and entitlement-based measures and public perception management.

According to the policy, the approach in the worst LWE affected areas will focus on security interventions, in moderately affected areas it will witness security and development initiatives going hand in hand, while in less affected areas, development interventions will take precedence.

4.8 Evaluation of Government's Action to Control Naxalism

The Government of India has adopted a holistic approach to address the LWE insurgency. This approach is built around simultaneous implementation a security agenda, developmental activities and promotion of good governance.

- The National Policy and Action Plan to address LWE problem, by the MHA in 2014, essentially incorporates four elements – an integrated multi-pronged strategy comprising security related measures; development related initiatives, ensuring rights and entitlement related measures, and management of public perception plan.
- The Central Government has been implementing various flagship developmental schemes in coordination with the affected State Governments. Some of the prominent schemes are: The ‘Integrated Action Plan’ (IAP) or ‘Additional Central Assistance’ (ACA) for LWE affected districts public infrastructures and services in affected areas.

The Naxal issue is complex, widespread and rooted in local factors. A report on Naxalism, published by the Planning Commission, made this accurate observation: “Mobilising the support of the people is also absolutely

essential to weaken the support base of the Naxals. The political parties are not playing their role in this regard. The representatives of major political parties have virtually abdicated their responsibility.

4.9 Future Strategy to Eliminate Left-Wing Extremism

In order to comprehensively deal with Naxalite threat, the government has to address its root causes. Socio-economic alienation and the dissatisfaction with the widening economic and political inequality will not be solved by military force alone, which seems to be the main instrument employed by the government.

1. Socio-Economic Development:

Government's service delivery should be improved in these tribal areas. Both State and Center must ensure that things such as statutory minimum wages, access to land and water sources initiatives are implemented.

2. Dialogue

By opening dialogue, the Government can give opportunity for the rebels to join the mainstream by showing them that solutions can be created together with the Government, by being part of the political system in a legitimate way. For example, the former Director-General of Andhra Pradesh concluded that as a result of the ceasefire and dialogue with Maoists in 2004, the violence in the State decreased by 80-90 percent in the region.

3. Governance

Government at State and Centre needs to coordinate efforts for proper implementation of development schemes. Grievance redressal, access to formal source of credit and mass awareness about rights of tribals are keys to better governance.

4. Psychological Initiatives

Development practice has a critical role in providing the foundation for preventing violent extremism. *United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's)* conceptual framework proposes eleven interlinked building blocks for explaining how development can help prevent violent extremism. These building blocks, which will inform global, regional and national strategies for Left Wing Extremism will include:

- Promoting a rule of law and human rights-based approach to Left Wing Extremism.
- Enhancing the fight against corruption.
- Enhancing participatory decision-making and increasing civic space at national and local levels.

- Providing effective socio-economic alternatives to violence for groups at risk.
- Strengthening the capacity of local governments for service delivery and security.
- Supporting credible internal intermediaries to promote dialogue with alienated groups and reintegration of former extremists.
- Promoting gender equality and women's empowerment.
- Engaging youth in building social cohesion.
- Working with faith-based organizations and religious leaders to counter the abuse of religion by violent extremists.
- Working with the media to promote human rights and tolerance.
- Promoting respect for human rights, diversity and a culture of global citizenship in schools and universities.

5. Leveraging the use of technology

Such as micro or mini-UAVs or small drones, high-resolution PTZ cameras, GPS tracking, hand-held thermal imaging, radar and satellite imaging to minimize the loss of lives of security personnel.

6. Learning from best practices

Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh have been successful in minimizing Maoist activities to a large extent.

7. Similarly, as Chhattisgarh police have experience in tackling Maoists in Bastar, they are now coordinating with the bordering states to strengthen intelligence and ground presence.

Conclusion

It is the belief of the Government of India that through a holistic approach focussing on development and security related interventions, the LWE problem can be successfully tackled. However, it is clear that the Maoists do not want root causes like underdevelopment to be addressed in a meaningful manner since they resort to targeting school buildings, roads, railways, bridges, health infrastructure, communication facilities etc in a major way. They wish to keep the population in their areas of influence marginalized to perpetuate their outdated ideology. An ideology based on violence and annihilation is doomed to fail in a democracy which offers legitimate forums of grievance redressal.





TRY SOME MAINS PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTIONS

1. Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discussing the emerging issues is a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism. **(2022)**
2. What are the determinants of left-wing extremism in the Eastern part of India? What strategy should the Government of India, civil administration and security forces adopt to counter the threat in the affected areas? **(2020)**
3. Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is showing a downward trend but still affects many parts of the country. Briefly explain the Government of India's approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE. **(2018)**
4. The persisting drives of the government for the development of large industries in backward areas have resulted in isolating the tribal population and the farmers who face multiple displacements with Malkangiri and Naxalbari foci, discuss the corrective strategies needed to win the left-wing extremism (LWE) doctrine affected citizens back into the mainstream of social and economic growth. **(2015)**
5. Article 244 of the Indian Constitution relates to the Administration of Scheduled areas and tribal areas. Analyze the impact of non-implementation of the provisions of the fifth schedule on the growth of Left-Wing Extremism. **(2013)**

Key Points

1. **Introduction to Left-Wing Extremism (LWE):** GOI defines Naxalism and Maoism as LWE. Left-wing extremists endeavour to overcome the existing state and social order by replacing democracy with a communist or anarchist system.
 - **Maoism:** It is the doctrine to capture the state power through a combination of armed insurgency, mass mobilization and strategic alliances.
 - **Naxalism:** Naxals are considered far left radical communists who support Maoist political ideology.
 - **Factors Responsible for Naxalism:** Governance, Socio-economic and Cultural, Land related, Legislative.
 - **Objectives of Naxalites:**
 - ❖ Destroying State Power
 - ❖ Taking over Government
 - ❖ Creating mass base
 - ❖ Targeting legislature
 - ❖ Destroying public infrastructure
 - ❖ Radicalizing youth
 - **Urban Naxalism:** They are the people with naxalite bent of mind residing in urban areas and working as activists, supporters and protectors of the ideology.
 - **Challenges of Urban Naxalism**
 - ❖ Mobilizing industrial workers
 - ❖ Capturing students into their fold
 - ❖ Logistics support
 - ❖ Exploitation of urban fault lines
 - ❖ Shadowing behind civil society
 - **Way forward**
 - ❖ Tackling Urban Naxalism
 - ❖ Provision in budget
 - ❖ Legal proceedings
 - ❖ Systemic efforts
2. **Challenges in Dealing with Naxalism**
 - **Economic Efficiency:** Economic growth is the only solution to economic concern of tribal people.
 - **Social Justice:** The whole debate of social justice is an oscillation between class conflict and class cooperation.
 - **Security:** Lack of a common plan has left each state government combating the naxals as per their own strategy.
 - **Government's Approach to Counter Naxalism**
 - ❖ Police modernization
 - ❖ Scheme of fortified police stations
 - ❖ Development
 - ❖ Ensuring rights and entitlement of local communities
3. **Government's Response Against Naxalism**
 - ❖ Creation of LWE division
 - ❖ Surrender policies
 - ❖ Initiatives by individual states
 - ❖ SAMADHAN doctrine 2005
 - ❖ Schemes for LWE affected states
4. **Future Strategy to Eliminate LWE**
 - ❖ Socio-economic development
 - ❖ Dialogue
 - ❖ Governance
 - ❖ Psychological initiatives