{"id":66897,"date":"2026-02-17T17:32:21","date_gmt":"2026-02-17T12:02:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/?p=66897"},"modified":"2026-02-18T11:17:22","modified_gmt":"2026-02-18T05:47:22","slug":"structural-reset-india-federalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/editorial-analysis\/17-02-2026\/structural-reset-india-federalism","title":{"rendered":"A Structural Reset For India\u2019s Federalism"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Syllabus: GS2\/Polity &amp; Governance<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Recently, a <strong>high-level committee on Union\u2013State relations,<\/strong> <strong>submitted its first report to the Government of Tamil Nadu<\/strong> that deals with powers and responsibilities shared between the Union and the States.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>About India\u2019s Federalism<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Federalism<\/strong> is a system of government in which <strong>power is constitutionally divided <\/strong>between a <strong>central authority (Union)<\/strong> and <strong>regional governments (States).<\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>A federal system gives both levels <strong>independent authority within their own spheres, u<\/strong>nlike a unitary system (where all power flows from the centre).\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Neither level is legally subordinate to the other within those assigned domains.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>India\u2019s Unique Federal Design<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Constitutional Design: <\/strong>The Constitution (1950), influenced by the <strong>Government of India Act, 1935,<\/strong> created a strong <strong>Union List,<\/strong> a residuary power vested in Parliament, Emergency provisions (Articles 352, 356, 360), and a single Constitution and single citizenship.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Indian federalism was shaped by Partition, princely state integration, and fears of fragmentation, unlike classical federations (e.g., the US).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>India is often described as a <strong>\u2018Union of States\u2019<\/strong>, a phrase <strong>deliberately used in the Constitution<\/strong> to reflect unity with diversity.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>India\u2019s federalism is often called <strong>\u2018quasi-federal\u2019<\/strong> or <strong>\u2018federal with a unitary bias\u2019<\/strong>, as the Constitution of India gives the <strong>Union stronger authority<\/strong> in certain areas, especially during emergencies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-background has-fixed-layout\" style=\"background-color:#fff2cc\"><tbody><tr><td colspan=\"3\"><strong>Constitutional Division of Powers (Schedule VII)<\/strong><\/td><\/tr><tr><td><strong>List<\/strong><\/td><td><strong>Who Makes Laws?<\/strong><\/td><td><strong>Examples<\/strong><\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Union List<\/td><td>Parliament<\/td><td>Defence, Foreign Affairs, Currency<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>State List<\/td><td>State Legislatures<\/td><td>Police, Public Order, Public Health<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Concurrent List<\/td><td>Both<\/td><td>Education, Forests, Marriage<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Union law prevails (with limited exceptions) if there is a conflict in Concurrent List subjects. It reflects both:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The need for <strong>national unity<\/strong>, and recognition of <strong>regional diversity<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Core Foundational Principles of Indian Federalism<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Constitutional Supremacy: <\/strong>India does not operate on parliamentary supremacy (like the UK).\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The <strong>Constitution is supreme<\/strong>, i.e. both the Union and States derive their authority from it, and no government, either Union or State, can act beyond constitutional limits.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Division of Legislative, Executive &amp; Financial Powers: <\/strong>Federalism is not just about law-making. It also involves <strong>Legislative powers (law making)<\/strong>, <strong>Executive powers<\/strong>, and <strong>Financial powers.<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Revenue sharing is done through the Finance Commission, GST Council, and Centrally Sponsored Schemes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Cooperative Federalism: <\/strong>India\u2019s model is not meant to be competitive or adversarial. The ideal vision is <strong>cooperative federalism<\/strong>, meaning:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Union and States work together.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Policies are discussed collaboratively.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Institutions like the Inter-State Council and GST Council encourage consultation.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>More recently, the phrase <strong>\u2018competitive federalism\u2019<\/strong> has emerged, meaning States compete in performance (investment, ease of doing business, governance reforms).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Unity with Diversity: <\/strong>India is linguistically, culturally, and economically diverse. Federalism accommodates different languages, development models, and governance experiments.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>For example: Tamil Nadu pioneered the noon meal scheme; Kerala achieved strong public health outcomes; Maharashtra experimented with employment guarantee schemes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Asymmetrical Federalism: <\/strong>India does not treat all States identically. Some States historically enjoyed special provisions like Sixth Schedule areas for tribal regions in Northeast India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Judicial Safeguards: Federalism as Basic Structure<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>S.R. Bommai vs Union of India (1994): <\/strong>The Supreme Court held that <strong>Federalism is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution.<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>States are not \u2018mere appendages\u2019 of the Centre, and they are supreme within their constitutional sphere.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The term <strong>\u2018Basic Structure\u2019<\/strong> means that even <strong>Parliament cannot amend<\/strong> the Constitution in a way that destroys federalism.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Article 356 (President\u2019s Rule) is subject to judicial review.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Commissions on Centre\u2013State Relations<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Rajamannar Committee (1971): <\/strong>Established by Tamil Nadu, it argued for greater State autonomy and clearer limits on Union encroachment.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Sarkaria Commission (1983\u20131988): <\/strong>Recommended cooperative federalism, restraint in using Article 356, and consultation with States.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Punchhi Commission (2007\u20132010): <\/strong>Called for redefining the Governor\u2019s role and strengthening intergovernmental mechanisms.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Concerns &amp; Issues Around India\u2019s Federalism<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Centralisation of Legislative Powers: <\/strong>Parliament increasingly legislates on subjects where States also have authority.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Provisions such as <strong>Articles 249 and 250 allow Parliament to legislate on State subjects<\/strong> under certain conditions, raising concerns about <strong>gradual erosion of State spheres<\/strong>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>It reduces meaningful State autonomy when uniform national laws override local policy choices.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Misuse and Legacy of Article 356: <\/strong>Article 356 (President\u2019s Rule) was frequently invoked for political reasons before <em>S.R. Bommai<\/em> (1994).\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Supreme Court restricted arbitrary use, making proclamations judicially reviewable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Role of Governors: <\/strong>Major concerns include<strong> <\/strong>delays or refusal of assent to State Bills, discretionary powers in government formation, and reporting under Article 356.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Fiscal Federalism Imbalances:<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Vertical Imbalance: <\/strong>States bear substantial expenditure responsibilities (health, education, agriculture), yet major taxation powers are concentrated at the Union level.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Conditional Transfers: <\/strong>Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) under <strong>Article 282 <\/strong>allow the Union to impose policy templates through tied grants.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Finance Commission Dynamics<\/strong>: The broader concern is that fiscal dependence weakens substantive autonomy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>GST and Shared Sovereignty: <\/strong>The introduction of the GST (2017) restructured fiscal federalism. <strong>Concerns include <\/strong>loss of independent taxation space for States, GST compensation disputes, voting structure within the GST Council, and increasing central coordination over tax rates.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>It lies between <strong>uniform market integration<\/strong> and <strong>fiscal autonomy<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Executive Federalism &amp; Institutional Drift: <\/strong>Intergovernmental bodies such as NITI Aayog, GST Council, and Inter-State Council have reshaped federal practice.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The decision-making increasingly occurs through executive forums rather than legislative federalism, reducing transparency and formal accountability.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Asymmetric Federalism Under Strain: <\/strong>India accommodates <strong>asymmetry (e.g., special provisions for certain States).<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>However, reorganisation of states, alteration of special status arrangements, and uniform policy drives have raised questions about how asymmetry is protected within a centralising framework.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Political Centralisation: <\/strong>Strong single-party dominance at the Union level, particularly when the same party governs multiple States, can create \u2018high command\u2019 culture, reduced bargaining autonomy, and policy uniformity pressures.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Conversely, coalition eras historically strengthened negotiated federalism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Way Forward: Strengthening India\u2019s Federalism<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Limit Overreach in the Concurrent List: <\/strong>Parliament should exercise restraint in legislating on Concurrent subjects unless national uniformity is indispensable.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Revitalising Article 263 institutions can institutionalise structured dialogue rather than ad hoc negotiation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Reform the Role of Governors: <\/strong>Establish transparent criteria for appointment; fix timelines for assent to State Bills; and codify discretionary powers more clearly.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Commissions (Sarkaria, Punchhi) have recommended insulating the office from partisan influence. Implementing these reforms would reduce recurring Centre &#8211; State conflicts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Revisit Article 282 Practices: <\/strong>Clarify limits on discretionary grants to prevent fiscal centralisation.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Need to ensure predictable, transparent, and rule-based devolution criteria.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Recalibrate GST Governance: <\/strong>The improvements are needed for greater deliberative transparency, timely compensation mechanisms, mechanisms for limited State rate flexibility in defined sectors. It would balance market integration with fiscal autonomy.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Institutionalise Cooperative &amp; Competitive Federalism: <\/strong>India\u2019s federal future lies in combining <strong>Cooperative federalism<\/strong> (shared decision-making), and <strong>Competitive federalism<\/strong> (policy innovation and benchmarking).\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Encouraging States to experiment, while sharing best practices horizontally, strengthens overall governance capacity.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-background has-fixed-layout\" style=\"background-color:#ebecf0\"><tbody><tr><td><strong>Daily Mains Practice Question<\/strong><br><strong>[Q]<\/strong> Examine whether India\u2019s federal system requires a structural reset aligning with contemporary political and administrative realities.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/lead\/indias-federalism-is-in-need-of-a-structural-reset\/article70639834.ece\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Source: TH<\/a><br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-buttons is-layout-flex wp-block-buttons-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-button\"><a class=\"wp-block-button__link wp-element-button\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/Daily-Editorial-Analysis-17-02-2026.pdf\"><strong>Download PDF<\/strong><\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Published on:<\/strong> 17 February, 2026<\/p>\n<p>Recently, a high-level committee on Union\u2013State relations, submitted its first report to the Government of Tamil Nadu that deals with powers and responsibilities shared between the Union and the States.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":66899,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[22],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66897","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-editorial-analysis"],"acf":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/wp-images.nextias.com\/cdn-cgi\/image\/format=auto\/ca\/uploads\/2026\/02\/Editorial-Analysis-900-600-11.webp","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66897","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66897"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66897\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":66954,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66897\/revisions\/66954"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/66899"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66897"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66897"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66897"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}