{"id":60018,"date":"2025-11-27T20:10:21","date_gmt":"2025-11-27T14:40:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/?p=60018"},"modified":"2025-11-28T13:33:23","modified_gmt":"2025-11-28T08:03:23","slug":"sc-to-consider-plea-to-revive-njac-cji","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/current-affairs\/27-11-2025\/sc-to-consider-plea-to-revive-njac-cji","title":{"rendered":"SC to \u2018consider\u2019 plea to revive NJAC: CJI"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Syllabus: GS2\/ Indian Polity<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>In News<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Chief Justice of India (CJI) recently stated that the Supreme Court would consider a plea seeking to revive the<strong> National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) <\/strong>and put an end to the <strong>existing Collegium System.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What is NJAC?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>NJAC was envisaged as a<strong> constitutional body <\/strong>to handle appointments\/transfers of judges to the higher judiciary (Supreme Court and High Courts).\u00a0<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Under the <strong>99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014<\/strong> and the accompanying NJAC Act, 2014, new constitutional<strong> Articles (124A\u2013124C) were inserted to establish NJAC.<\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Composition of NJAC:<\/strong> Chief Justice of India as the ex-officio Chairperson, the two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, the Union Minister of Law and Justice, and two eminent persons.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The eminent persons were to be selected by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India, and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>In 2015, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court (Fourth Judges Case) struck down the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act by a 4:1 majority,<strong> declaring them unconstitutional.<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Court held that giving the executive (via Law Minister) and non-judicial persons veto or decisive role in judicial appointments compromised the independence of judiciary, which is part of the<strong> \u201cbasic structure\u201d of the Constitution.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-background\" style=\"background-color:#fff2cc\"><thead><tr><th class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Aspect<\/strong><\/th><th class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Arguments Against NJAC (Favours Collegium)<\/strong><\/th><th class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Arguments For NJAC Revival (Against Collegium)<\/strong><\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Judicial Independence<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">The NJAC compromises independence by giving the Executive influence. Judicial Primacy is essential for an impartial judiciary.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">Judges appointing judges (Judicial Self-Appointment) is against democratic principles and the spirit of checks and balances.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Political Influence<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">The Law Minister and PM-nominated members introduce the risk of political bias and quid pro quo appointments.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">The Executive (Government) is the largest litigant in courts; it must have a stake in who decides its cases to ensure basic scrutiny.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Accountability &amp; Transparency<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">The Collegium is a black box operating without a constitutional basis, formal Secretariat, or published criteria.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">The NJAC, with diverse members, promotes transparency and accountability to the public. The &#8216;Eminent Persons&#8217; bring a non-judicial, civil society perspective.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Veto Power<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">The two-member veto power in the NJAC could effectively empower the Executive to block any name, regardless of judicial merit.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">The lack of any mechanism to veto controversial judicial appointments in the Collegium leads to non-accountable decisions and allegations of nepotism.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Separation of Powers<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">True separation requires each branch to control its own composition. The Executive appoints its ministers, Legislature its Speaker\u2014judiciary must appoint its judges.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">Absolute separation is a myth. Even in established democracies, judicial appointments involve multiple branches.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Speed &amp; Efficiency<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">The Collegium, despite delays, processes recommendations. The real bottleneck is government clearance, not judicial selection. NJAC would add more bureaucratic layers.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">The Collegium&#8217;s informal, secretive consultations cause massive delays. An institutional mechanism with timelines and procedures (like NJAC) would expedite appointments.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Present System of Appointments in Higher Judiciary (Collegium System)<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Overview:\u00a0<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The existing system for appointments in India&#8217;s higher judiciary (Supreme Court and High Courts) is the Collegium System, evolved through judicial interpretations of Articles 124 and 217, rather than explicit constitutional text.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Under Article 124(2),<\/strong> Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and other SC judges as needed.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Under Article 217(1),<\/strong> High Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with CJI, the High Court Chief Justice (HC CJ), and state Governor.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Evolution via Judges Cases:<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>First Judges Case (1981): <\/strong>&#8220;Consultation&#8221; means executive primacy; CJI opinion not binding.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Second Judges Case (1993): <\/strong>Overruled prior; CJI primacy in appointments, formed collegium of CJI + two senior SC judges.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Third Judges Case (1998):<\/strong> Expanded SC Collegium to CJI + four senior-most SC judges; binding if reiterated after government objections.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Appointment Process:<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Supreme Court Judges:<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>SC Collegium (CJI + 4 seniors) recommends names based on merit, integrity, diversity.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Sent to the Law Ministry; the government can object once, but must appoint if reiterated.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The President formally appoints.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>High Court Judges:<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>HC Collegium (HC CJ + 2 seniors) initiates; sends to CJI\/SC Collegium for approval.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Same government scrutiny; President appoints after Governor input.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Source: TH<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p><strong>In News<\/strong><\/p>\n<li class=\"ms-5\">The Chief Justice of India (CJI) recently stated that the Supreme Court would consider a plea seeking to revive the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) and put an end to the existing Collegium System.<\/li>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><strong>What is NJAC?<\/strong><\/p>\n<li class=\"ms-5\">NJAC was envisaged as a constitutional body to handle appointments\/transfers of judges to the higher judiciary (Supreme Court and High Courts).\u00a0<\/li>\n<li class=\"ms-5\">Under the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014 and the accompanying NJAC Act, 2014, new constitutional Articles (124A\u2013124C) were inserted to establish NJAC.<\/li>\n<li class=\"ms-5\">Composition of NJAC: Chief Justice of India as the ex-officio Chairperson, the two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, the Union Minister of Law and Justice, and two eminent persons.<\/li>\n<li class=\"ms-5\">The eminent persons were to be selected by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India, and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha.<\/li>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/current-affairs\/27-11-2025\/sc-to-consider-plea-to-revive-njac-cji\" class=\"btn btn-primary btn-sm float-end\">Read\u00a0More<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-60018","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-current-affairs"],"acf":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60018","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60018"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60018\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":60028,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60018\/revisions\/60028"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60018"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60018"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60018"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}