{"id":59171,"date":"2025-11-14T18:54:58","date_gmt":"2025-11-14T13:24:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/?p=59171"},"modified":"2025-11-15T13:10:39","modified_gmt":"2025-11-15T07:40:39","slug":"global-nuclear-order","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/editorial-analysis\/14-11-2025\/global-nuclear-order","title":{"rendered":"Global Nuclear Order"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Syllabus: GS2\/International Relation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The recent <strong>US President\u2019s renewed \u2018nuclear testing<\/strong> <strong>on an equal basis\u2019<\/strong> <strong>with Russia and China <\/strong>signaled a return to nuclear weapons testing, challenging decades of international restraint and global arms control dynamics.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Evolution of the Global Nuclear Order<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Early Cold War (1945\u20131962): <\/strong>The <strong>Global Nuclear Order<\/strong> has <strong>evolved from Cold War deterrence <\/strong>where the doctrine of <strong>mutually assured destruction (MAD)<\/strong> kept superpowers from direct conflict.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The dawn of the atomic age after <strong>Hiroshima and Nagasaki.<\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>US\u2013USSR arms race<\/strong> and the emergence of deterrence theory.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Cuban Missile Crisis <\/strong>as the defining moment; prompted first arms-control efforts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Institutionalizing Control (1960s\u20131990s):<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1968<\/strong>: The cornerstone of the nuclear order \u2014 non-proliferation, disarmament, peaceful uses.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Negotiations:<\/strong> It bans \u2018any nuclear weapon test explosion\u2019. It has <strong>never entered into force<\/strong>, despite 187 signatures.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Key non-ratifiers: <strong>U.S., China, Israel, Egypt, Iran<\/strong>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Non-signatories: <strong>India, Pakistan, North Korea<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Post-Cold War Optimism:<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Declining Arsenals, Limited Proliferation: <\/strong>Global nuclear stockpiles fell from <strong>65,000 weapons in the late 1970s<\/strong> to <strong>under 12,500<\/strong> currently.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Only about <strong>nine states<\/strong> possess nuclear weapons, far fewer than the two dozen predicted in the 1960s.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Cooperative Threat Reduction<\/strong> to secure loose Soviet nuclear materials.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>US\u2013Soviet Bilateral Treaties:<\/strong> Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I\/II, Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I\/II.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Factors Undermining Global Nuclear Order<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Collapse of Arms-Control Architecture: <\/strong>US withdrawal from the <strong>ABM Treaty (2002)<\/strong>; Breakdown of the <strong>INF Treaty (2019)<\/strong>; Fragility of <strong>New START<\/strong>, the last remaining US\u2013Russia treaty.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>New START, <\/strong>the sole<strong> remaining US \u2013 Russia arms control treaty, <\/strong>which will <strong>expire in February 2026<\/strong> with no negotiations planned.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Violations, Vetoes, and Erosion of Norms: <\/strong>North Korea\u2019s nuclear breakout; Iran\u2019s JCPOA instability; Lack of consensus in NPT Review Conferences; and Great-power vetoes at the UN undermining enforcement.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>China\u2019s Rapid Arsenal Expansion: <\/strong>Development of <strong>MIRVs<\/strong>, new silos, hypersonics; China\u2019s shift from<strong> minimum to \u2018medium\u2019 deterrence.<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>China\u2019s arsenal is projected to exceed <strong>1,000 warheads by 2030<\/strong>, transforming the strategic balance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Russia\u2013Ukraine War and the Nuclear Shadow: <\/strong>Nuclear threats used as coercion; debates on NATO\u2019s nuclear posture; and fear of nuclear use by a conventionally inferior but nuclear-armed belligerent.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Technology Disruption: <\/strong>AI-enabled early warning, autonomous systems, space-based sensors, hypersonic glide vehicles etc are increasing <strong>first-strike instability<\/strong>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Modernization Without Explosive Testing:<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Russia<\/strong>: Tests of <strong>Burevestnik<\/strong> (nuclear-powered cruise missile) and <strong>Poseidon <\/strong>(nuclear-powered underwater drone).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>China<\/strong>: Hypersonic glide vehicle tests since 2021.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>United States<\/strong>: New B61-13 gravity bomb, W76-2 low-yield warhead, and a nuclear-armed SLCM.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Modern Capabilities Increase Usability: <\/strong>Low-yield warheads, hypersonic delivery systems, and unmanned platforms increase the risk of early or mistaken nuclear use.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Missile defense expansions such as the proposed US \u2018golden dome\u2019 signal a new competitive cycle among nuclear states.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Cascade Effect: India, Pakistan, and Others<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>If the US resumes explosive testing:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>China and Russia<\/strong> will almost certainly follow.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>India<\/strong> would likely resume testing to validate its thermonuclear design.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Pakistan<\/strong> would match India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Other threshold states may be encouraged to pursue weapons, unraveling existing non-proliferation norms.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>India\u2019s Place in the Global Nuclear Order<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>India\u2019s Responsible Stakeholder Position: <\/strong>No First Use (NFU)\u2014though evolving debate; credible minimum deterrence; and strong compliance history despite being outside NPT.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>India\u2019s Diplomatic Role: <\/strong>Champion of <strong>Global South perspectives<\/strong> on non-proliferation; calls for universal disarmament and strategic restraint; and participation in <strong>export-control regimes (MTCR, Wassenaar, etc.)<\/strong> but <strong>excluded from NSG.<\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Challenges for India:<\/strong>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Pakistan\u2019s tactical nuclear weapons and unstable command structures.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>China\u2019s arsenal growth creates a two-front strategic problem.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Pressure to modernize and diversify nuclear delivery systems.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Way Forward: Possible Future Pathways<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Multipolar Nuclear Order: <\/strong>Return of great-power rivalry;\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Decentralised deterrence with more nuclear dyads and triads; and&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Higher risk of miscalculation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Rebuilding Arms Control: <\/strong>Need for <strong>US\u2013China\u2013Russia<\/strong> trilateral frameworks.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Region-specific arrangements for South Asia, Middle East, and East Asia.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Transparency measures and crisis hotlines.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Technological Governance: <\/strong>Limits on autonomous nuclear decision-making.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Global rules for AI-enabled command-and-control.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Restrictions on hypersonics and space weaponization.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Reviving Disarmament Norms: <\/strong>Pressure from civil society and non-nuclear states.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The <strong>Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)<\/strong> as a moral instrument, even if major powers stay out.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-background\" style=\"background-color:#fff2cc\"><tbody><tr><td><strong>Daily Mains Practice Question<\/strong><br><strong>[Q]<\/strong> Evaluate the evolution of the global nuclear order from the Cold War era to the present day. How shifting geopolitical alliances influenced the prospects for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation?<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/lead\/donald-trump-shakes-up-the-global-nuclear-order\/article70276257.ece\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Source: TH<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-buttons is-layout-flex wp-block-buttons-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-button\"><a class=\"wp-block-button__link wp-element-button\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/UPSC-Editorial-Analysis-14-November-2025.PDF.pdf\">Download PDF<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The recent US President\u2019s renewed \u2018nuclear testing on an equal basis\u2019 with Russia and China signaled a return to nuclear weapons testing, challenging decades of international restraint and global arms control dynamics.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[22],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-59171","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-editorial-analysis"],"acf":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59171","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=59171"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59171\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":59190,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59171\/revisions\/59190"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=59171"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=59171"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=59171"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}