{"id":39916,"date":"2025-03-27T18:59:31","date_gmt":"2025-03-27T13:29:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/?p=39916"},"modified":"2025-03-27T20:41:35","modified_gmt":"2025-03-27T15:11:35","slug":"justice-varma-case-revisiting-njac","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/editorial-analysis\/27-03-2025\/justice-varma-case-revisiting-njac","title":{"rendered":"Justice Varma Case: Revisiting NJAC"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Syllabus: GS2\/Polity &amp; Governance<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Justice Yashwant Varma controversy has reignited debates about judicial accountability, the process of appointing judges in India and brought the <strong>National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC)<\/strong> back into the spotlight.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-background\" style=\"background-color:#ebecf0\"><tbody><tr><td><strong>About Justice Varma Controversy<\/strong><br>&#8211; The controversy began with the discovery of semi-burnt sacks of cash at Justice Varma&#8217;s residence following a fire incident.&nbsp;<br>&#8211; While the Supreme Court has initiated an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/current-affairs\/25-03-2025\/judiciary-in-house-inquiry-delhi-high-court-judge\"><strong>in-house inquiry<\/strong><\/a><strong>,<\/strong> the case has sparked widespread discussions about the transparency and accountability of the judiciary.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Evolution of the Judiciary Appointments in India<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Pre-Collegium Era (1950\u20131973): <\/strong>Initially, <strong>Article 124(2) <\/strong>and <strong>Article 217<\/strong> of the Constitution of India granted the <strong>President the power to appoint judges<\/strong> to the Supreme Court and High Courts, respectively, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and other judges.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The <strong>executive had the upper hand<\/strong> in judicial appointments, with the <strong>President (on the advice of the Council of Ministers) making final decisions.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>First Judges Case (1981) \u2013 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India: <\/strong>The Supreme Court ruled that <strong>\u2018consultation\u2019 with the CJI did not mean \u2018concurrence\u2019<\/strong> meaning the <strong>executive had more power<\/strong> in judicial appointments.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>It allowed greater government interference in appointments.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Second Judges Case (1993) \u2013 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India:<\/strong> It overturned the First Judges Case, and <strong>established the Collegium System<\/strong>, giving primacy to the judiciary in appointments.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The ruling held that<strong> CJI\u2019s recommendation<\/strong>, in consultation with senior judges, would be <strong>binding on the President.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Third Judges Case (1998) \u2013 Presidential Reference: <\/strong>The composition of the Collegium was clarified:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>SC Judges&#8217; appointments: <\/strong>The CJI and four senior-most judges.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>HC Judges&#8217; appointments:<\/strong> The CJI and two senior-most judges.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC)<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>It was established through the <strong>99th Constitutional Amendment in 2014<\/strong> <strong>to replace the Collegium System<\/strong> with a committee including the executive with judiciary.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>It aimed to make judicial appointments more transparent by involving the executive and eminent persons alongside the judiciary.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>However, the<strong> Supreme Court of India<\/strong>, in 2015, <strong>struck down NJAC<\/strong>, ruling it <strong>unconstitutional<\/strong>, as it diluted judicial independence.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Key Reasons For Revisiting the NJAC<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Concerns Over Collegium System: <\/strong>Lack of transparency; No clear criteria for selection.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Supreme Court&#8217;s opaque decision-making process in appointments raises concerns about <strong>favoritism<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Legislative Consensus &amp; Judicial Overreach:<\/strong> The NJAC was passed with <strong>near-unanimous support <\/strong>in Parliament and <strong>ratified by 16 state legislatures<\/strong>, reflecting a broad consensus on the need for reform.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>It was argued that the reinstatement of the Collegium system (after NJAC) was an example of judicial overreach.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Delays in Judicial Appointments:<\/strong> The long, secretive collegium process leads to delays in filling vacancies, affecting judicial efficiency.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Executive-judiciary tension; Government delays in approving names.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Lack of Diversity:<\/strong> The current system has been criticized for not ensuring adequate representation from various sections of society, particularly marginalized communities and women.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Addressing Case Backlogs:<\/strong> With over 4.4 crore pending cases in Indian courts, judicial vacancies need urgent attention.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>A well-functioning NJAC can help streamline appointments, ensuring a faster selection process and filling vacancies more efficiently.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Balancing Independence and Oversight:<\/strong> A revised NJAC can ensure that executive involvement does not compromise judicial independence.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>It could be achieved by maintaining a judiciary-dominated body while allowing limited and structured participation from the executive.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Way Forward<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Global Practices:<\/strong> Many democracies involve a mix of judicial and executive inputs in judicial appointments.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The <strong>United Kingdom has the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC),<\/strong> an independent commission ensuring merit-based appointments.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Revisiting the NJAC could align India\u2019s system with global best practices while addressing domestic concerns.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The <strong>International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)<\/strong> released a report advocating for a new law to establish a <strong>&#8216;Judicial Council&#8217;,<\/strong> aiming for judicial appointments and transfers based on transparent, predetermined, and objective criteria.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Modifying the Composition of NJAC: <\/strong>Instead of granting excessive influence to the executive, the revised NJAC can include members from the judiciary, executive, and civil society to ensure balanced participation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Ensuring Judicial Primacy: <\/strong>While the executive may be given a role, judicial independence should remain paramount by ensuring that judges hold a majority in the commission.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Transparency Mechanisms:<\/strong> Clear guidelines on appointments, merit-based selection, and reasons for rejections should be made public to avoid favoritism.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Timely Appointments:<\/strong> A defined timeline for recommendations and approvals should be mandated to prevent delays.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Inclusion and Diversity:<\/strong> Special emphasis should be given to appointing judges from diverse backgrounds to make the judiciary more representative of society.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Justice Varma case underscores the urgent need for judicial reform in India. Revisiting the NJAC could provide a framework for a more transparent and accountable judiciary while preserving its independence.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>As the debate continues, the Supreme Court has an opportunity to lead the way in restoring public trust and ensuring the integrity of India&#8217;s judicial system.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-background\" style=\"background-color:#fff2cc\"><tbody><tr><td><strong>Daily Mains Practice Question<\/strong><br><strong>[Q]<\/strong> How can revisiting the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) balance judicial independence and transparency while addressing concerns about the opacity of the collegium system?<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/article\/opinion\/columns\/justice-varma-case-supreme-court-must-revisit-njac-9908106\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Source: IE<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-buttons is-layout-flex wp-block-buttons-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-button\"><a class=\"wp-block-button__link wp-element-button\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/UPSC-Editorial-Analysis-27-March-2025.pdf.pdf\">Download PDF<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Justice Yashwant Varma controversy has reignited debates about judicial accountability, the process of appointing judges in India and brought the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) back into the spotlight.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[22],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-39916","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-editorial-analysis"],"acf":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39916","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=39916"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39916\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":39945,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39916\/revisions\/39945"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=39916"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=39916"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nextias.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=39916"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}